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Reality of the quantum state: Towards a stronger ψ-ontology theorem
Shane Mansfield∗
Institut de Recherche en Informatique Fondamentale, Universite´ Paris Diderot - Paris 7 and
Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford
The Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph no-go theorem provides an argument for the reality of the quantum
state by ruling out ψ-epistemic ontological theories, in which the quantum state is of a statistical
nature. It applies under an assumption of preparation independence, the validity of which has
been subject to debate. We propose two plausible and less restrictive alternatives: a weaker notion
allowing for classical correlations, and an even weaker, physically motivated notion of independence,
which merely prohibits the possibility of super-luminal causal influences in the preparation process.
The latter is a minimal requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of subsystems in any
theory. It is demonstrated by means of an explicit ψ-epistemic ontological model that the argument
of PBR becomes invalid under the alternative notions of independence. As an intermediate step,
we recover a result which is valid in the presence of classical correlations. Finally, we obtain a
theorem which holds under the minimal requirement, approximating the result of PBR. For this, we
consider experiments involving randomly sampled preparations and derive bounds on the degree of
ψ epistemicity that is consistent with the quantum-mechanical predictions. The approximation is
exact in the limit as the sample space of preparations becomes infinite.
I. INTRODUCTION
A number of recent theorems have addressed the issue
of the nature of the quantum state [1–5]. If we suppose
that each system has a certain real-world configuration
or state of the matter, the description of which we will
call its ontic state, then we may pose the question of how
a system’s quantum state relates to its ontic state.
On the one hand, one might consider a pure quantum
state as corresponding directly to, or being uniquely de-
termined by, the ontic state, just as the state in classical
mechanics (a point in classical phase space) is completely
determined by the ontic state or real-world description of
the system. On the other hand, the quantum state dif-
fers from a classical state of this kind in that in general it
may only be used to make probabilistic predictions about
the system. Therefore, one might consider that it merely
represents our probabilistic, partial knowledge of the on-
tic state of a system, and moreover that a given ontic
state may be compatible with distinct quantum states.
Rather convincing plausibility arguments can be made
to support either of these views, which are referred to
as ψ-ontic and ψ-epistemic, respectively [6]. The the-
orems go a step further and prove that under certain
assumptions the ψ-epistemic view is untenable. We are
especially concerned with the first of these results, the
Pusey-Barrett-Rudolph (PBR) theorem [1], which has re-
ceived the most attention and is considered by some to
provide the most convincing case for the reality of the
quantum state [7].
Most of the PBR assumptions are common to the fa-
miliar no-go theorems of Bell [8], Kochen & Specker [9],
etc. These we refer to as ontological assumptions, which
are briefly summarised in Sec. II [10]. In addition to
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the common ontological assumptions, each no-go theo-
rem postulates some form of independence for composite
systems or observations; for example, for Bell this is the
locality assumption, while for PBR it is the novel as-
sumption of preparation independence. The validity of
this new assumption has been called into question else-
where [11–17]. In Sec. III, we give a precise definition of
preparation independence and provide our own critique
of its strength, building on earlier work by the author
[18, 19]. In particular, it is pointed out that the assump-
tion is too strong even to allow for classical correlations
in multipartite scenarios.
To address the issue, we propose two plausible and
less restrictive alternatives. The first allows for classical
correlations mediated through a common past, while the
second is a much weaker, physically motivated notion of
independence, which, as we will explain, is a minimal
requirement for enabling a reasonable treatment of sub-
systems in any theory. In Sec. IV we outline the PBR
argument and provide a statement of the theorem; but in
Sec. V we see that the PBR argument is no longer valid
under the weaker notions of independence, and demon-
strate this by means of an explicit ψ-epistemic toy model.
At first, this would appear to re-open the door to the pos-
sibility of plausible statistical or ψ-epistemic interpreta-
tions of the quantum state.
However, in Sec. VI we recover two ψ-ontology results
which hold under the weaker notions of independence.
An intermediate step is to obtain a result which holds
in the presence of classical correlations. Our main theo-
rem holds under the minimal notion of independence and
approximates the result of PBR. The analysis relies on a
proposed experiment involving randomly sampled prepa-
rations. The proof makes use of a finite de Finetti the-
orem [20], establishing a mathematical connection to ψ-
ontology results. It also supposes that a certain symme-
try present at the phenomenological level is reflected at
the ontological level. The theorem places bounds on the
2degree of ψ epistemicity that is consistent with the exper-
imentally testable quantum-mechanical predictions. Our
conclusion of approximate ψ ontology improves mono-
tonically as the size of the sample space of preparations
increases and is exact in the limit as the sample space
becomes infinite.
II. ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS
The first major assumption is that a system has an
underlying physical state described by an element λ of a
measurable space (Λ,L), which is referred to as the ontic
state of the system. This may or may not coincide with
the quantum state. The space of ontic states is analogous
to classical phase space. Furthermore, it is assumed that
each pure quantum state ψ induces a probability distri-
bution µψ on (Λ,L), such that preparation of the system
in the quantum state ψ results in an ontic state sampled
according to the distribution µψ. It is also assumed that
the outcome of any measurement on the system depends
solely on its ontic state: the probabilities of obtaining
particular outcomes o ∈ O are determined by measure-
ment response functions ξo : Λ → R+ with the property
that, for all λ ∈ Λ, ∑
o∈O
ξo(λ) = 1. (1)
Note that for the purposes of this article we need only
consider measurements with finite outcome sets. To-
gether, these assumptions encode the hypothesis that
quantum systems should be described by some (possi-
bly deeper or underlying) ontological theory. We will be
particularly interested in situations in which pure quan-
tum state preparations are drawn from some finite set
[21].
The second major assumption is that, whatever this
ontological theory might be, its predictions should agree
with those of quantum mechanics. No-go theorems arise
when it is found that predictions disagree for certain
classes of ontological theories. Experimental tests may
then be proposed to rule in favour of the predictions of
quantum theory on the one hand or certain kinds of on-
tological theories on the other, though to our current
knowledge all experimental evidence points to the cor-
rectness of quantum theory. So far, the assumptions
posited are, in one form or another, common to the no-go
theorems of Bell, Kochen & Specker, etc.
A. ψ-ontic vs ψ-epistemic ontologies
We can already ask the following important question.
Question 1. Is it possible for distinct pure quantum
states ψ, φ to give rise to ontic state distributions µψ, µφ
which “overlap” (see Fig. 1)?
The question is significant because if the answer is no
then we may argue that the quantum state is always
uniquely defined by the ontic state, and is in this sense
an aspect of physical reality. If, on the other hand, an
overlap exists for some pair of distinct, pure quantum
states, then there would be instances in which the ontic
state or real-world description of the system would not
uniquely determine its quantum state. This would pro-
vide justification for understanding the quantum state as
being of an epistemic nature.
This allows us to distinguish between ψ-ontic and ψ-
epistemic ontological theories, as those which do or do
not admit epistemic overlaps, respectively. The distinc-
tion was first formalised in [6], to which the reader is
referred for a more detailed discussion.
Precisely, in the present discussion, we will quantify
the epistemic overlap between pure quantum states ψ, φ
by
ω(ψ, φ) := 1−D(µψ, µφ), (2)
where D(µψ, µφ) is the trace distance between the distri-
butions µψ, µφ. In instances in which it is clear which
quantum states are being considered, we may simply
denote this quantity by ω. Suppose that we can pre-
pare a system in one of the quantum states ψ, φ; then
ω(ψ, φ) may be understood as the minimum probability
of obtaining an ontic state which is compatible with both
quantum states, and which thus witnesses the epistemic
nature of the quantum state with respect to the ontolog-
ical theory in question.
FIG. 1. The existence or non-existence of non-trivial epis-
temic overlaps for distributions induced by pairs of distinct,
pure quantum states characterises (a) ψ-epistemic and (b) ψ-
ontic ontological theories, respectively. The term epistemic
overlap is made precise in Eq. (2).
III. INDEPENDENCE ASSUMPTIONS
A. Preparation independence
In addition to the standard ontological assumptions
of the previous section, the PBR theorem requires an as-
sumption that systems which are prepared independently
should have uncorrelated ontic states. More precisely,
preparation independence asserts that the joint probabil-
3ity distribution induced by multipartite preparations is
simply the product distribution. It will suffice to con-
sider preparations drawn locally from some finite sets
[22], and to describe the property for bipartite systems
[as in Fig. 2(a)] consisting of ontic state spaces (ΛA,LA)
and (ΛB ,LB). In this setting the assumption can be ex-
pressed as
µ(LA, LB | pA, pB) = µ(LA | pA)µ(LB | pB), (3)
for all LA ∈ LA, LB ∈ LB and pA, pB pure quantum
state preparations in the respective subsystems. The
assumption is perhaps best motivated by the fact that
within quantum theory we may consider product quan-
tum states of compound systems, which are completely
uncorrelated, so it may therefore be expected that the
same situation would hold at the ontological level.
B. Classical correlations
One way in which preparation independence might rea-
sonably be violated, however, is through classical corre-
lations arising in the ontic states, mediated through a
common past (related points have been raised by Hall
[11] and by Schlosshauer and Fine [12]). Suppose this
mediator can take values in an auxiliary measure space
(Λc,Lc). An effective form of preparation independence
might then be recovered by conditioning on this common
past [see Fig. 2(b)], resulting in a kind of independence
that bears a formal similarity to Bell locality; i.e.,
µ(LA, LB | pA, pB , Lc) = µ(LA | pA, Lc)µ(LB | pB , Lc),
(4)
for all LA ∈ LA, LB ∈ LB , Lc ∈ Lc, and pA, pB pure
quantum state preparations in the respective subsystems.
C. Subsystem condition
We go a step further and propose an even weaker no-
tion of independence, which we call the subsystem con-
dition. The condition is that the ontic state distribution
of each subsystem is uncorrelated with the preparation
setting of the other(s) [see Fig. 2(c)]; i.e.,
µ(LA | pA, pB) = µ(LA | pA),
µ(LB | pA, pB) = µ(LB | pB), (5)
for all LA ∈ LA, LB ∈ LB and pA, pB pure quantum state
preparations in the respective subsystems.
Otherwise stated, it requires the existence of well-
defined marginal probability distributions describing the
local behaviour of each preparation device. Without
this, it would not even be possible for the theory to de-
scribe the preparation of a state on a single subsystem
in isolation without having to make reference to all other
subsystems—simply put, one could not do local physics.
For instance, Question 1 could only be posed for the case
of pure states of the entire universe. We therefore pro-
pose that the subsystem condition should be considered
a minimal notion of independence in preparation scenar-
ios, required by any reasonable ontological theory.
This argument for requiring a minimal notion of inde-
pendence recalls Einstein’s comments on what it would
entail to completely abolish his “principle of local ac-
tion” (which was conceived in the context of measure-
ment rather than preparation scenarios, but by which we
may suppose he had in mind the kind of independence
up to classical correlations later formalised by Bell) [23]
[24]:
The following idea characterises the relative
independence of objects (A and B) far apart
in space: external influence on A has no im-
mediate influence on B; this is known as
the “Principle of Local Action”, which is
used consistently only in field theory. If
this axiom were to be completely abolished,
the existence of (quasi-)isolated systems, and
thereby the establishment of laws which can
be checked empirically in the accepted sense,
would become impossible.
Furthermore, the subsystem condition can be under-
stood as ruling out, at the ontological level, the possi-
bility of superluminal influences occurring in the prepa-
ration process. In this way, the condition is analogous
to the assumption of parameter independence for onto-
logical models in measurement scenarios, which is borne
out at the quantum-mechanical level by the no-signalling
theorem [25]. Both preparation independence [Eq. (3)]
and the notion of independence up to classical correla-
tions [Eq. (4)] imply the subsystem condition, but not
vice versa.
D. Other notions of independence and some
remarks
Similarly, in the language of Colbeck and Renner [2],
the subsystem condition would be implied by preparation
settings being free with respect to the causal structure of
Fig. 2(a).
Another notion of independence has been proposed by
Emerson, Serbin, Sutherland and Veitch [13]. It is similar
to the notion of independence up to classical correlations
described in Sec. III B, but in their case λc would mediate
between the systems without the constraint (4) that jus-
tifies considering it as a mediator of classical correlations
via a common past. Instead it is required that an effec-
tive kind of preparation independence as in Eq. (3) is ob-
tained if one marginalises to “forget” the auxiliary space
Λc. Problematically, however, correlations are therefore
allowed between pA, pB and λc and the subsystem condi-
tion is in general violated. Other works have attempted
to drop independence assumptions entirely, with some
4FIG. 2. (a) Spatially separated, preparation-independent de-
vices. (b) A classical correlation scenario in which correla-
tions may be mediated through a common past. (c) Dashed
lines represent correlations forbidden by the subsystem condi-
tion.
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success, though they obtain correspondingly weaker re-
sults that only rule out strong forms of ψ epistemicity
[26–31].
It is implicit in (3) and (5) that the set of ontic states in
a composite system is simply the Cartesian product of the
sets of ontic states in the component subsystems (Leifer
refers to this as the Cartesian product assumption [7]);
where they differ is in terms of the constraints placed on
global correlations. The situation is somewhat different
in classical correlation scenarios; we will return to this
issue in Sec. VI. Note also that each of the definitions
(3)–(5) generalises beyond the bipartite scenario in the
obvious way.
IV. THE PBR ARGUMENT
The PBR theorem [1] demonstrates a contradiction
between the predictions of quantum theory, on the one
hand, and of ψ-epistemic, preparation-independent onto-
logical theories on the other. In this section, we briefly
outline the argument [32]. To obtain the contradiction,
it is supposed that some pair of distinct pure quantum
states ψ, φ give rise to an epistemic overlap [33].
a. {ψ, φ} preparation devices. Consider a prepara-
tion device that is capable of preparing a system in ei-
ther of these two quantum states. Regardless of which of
the preparations is actually made, there is probability at
least ω > 0 of this device generating an ontic state which
witnesses the epistemic overlap, where ω is defined as in
Eq. (2).
b. Joint systems. We now consider a second such
preparation device, spacelike separated from, and to be
operated in parallel with, the first [as in Fig. 2(a)]. The
assumption of preparation independence is invoked to de-
duce that, regardless of which individual preparations are
made, there is probability at least ω2 > 0 of both devices
generating ontic states which witness the epistemic over-
lap, and, moreover, that in such a case it should be im-
possible to make any distinction about which of the joint
preparations
p ∈ {(ψ,ψ), (ψ, φ), (φ, ψ), (ψ,ψ)}
has been made. More generally, we may wish to consider
a joint system consisting of m subsystems, each equipped
with a {ψ, φ} preparation device, for which this deduc-
tion generalises in the obvious way.
c. Contradiction. The contradiction arises because
quantum theory does, in fact, allow such distinctions to
be made. In particular, for all pairs of qubit states, quan-
tum theory admits conclusive exclusion measurements
[34] on joint systems of the kind described above. In
the simplest case, in which only two subsystems are con-
sidered, a conclusive exclusion measurement would give
outcomes in the set
{¬(ψ,ψ),¬(ψ, φ),¬(φ, ψ),¬(φ, φ)},
with the property that outcome ¬(ψ,ψ) has probabil-
ity zero whenever the joint preparation (ψ,ψ) has been
made, so that its occurrence precludes the possibility of
the joint preparation having been (ψ,ψ), and so on [35].
Theorem 1. (PBR [1]). Suppose there exists a conclu-
sive exclusion measurement for a joint system in which
each subsystem is equipped with a {ψ, φ} preparation de-
vice. In any preparation-independent ontological theory
which can describe this experiment, ψ and φ have zero
epistemic overlap.
In other words, epistemic overlaps cannot be reconciled
with conclusive exclusion measurements if we accept the
assumption of preparation independence. Nevertheless,
within quantum theory, such measurements can be spec-
ified for all pairs of quantum states. So it follows that
any preparation-independent ontological theory which is
consistent with quantum theory is necessarily ψ ontic.
V. WHEN PBR NO LONGER APPLIES
In the absence of the assumption of preparation in-
dependence, however, it is still possible find ψ-epistemic
5TABLE I. Let ∆ denote the measurable set of ontic states
which witness an epistemic overlap of ψ and φ (the overlap
region), let ∆′ be its complement, and choose any ω1, ω2 > 0
such that ω1 +ω2 ≤ 1. For each possible pair of preparations
(pA, pB), the table specifies the probabilities that the resul-
tant ontic states (λA, λB) lie within the specified regions.
pA pB (∆,∆) (∆,∆
′) (∆′,∆) (∆′,∆′)
ψ ψ 0 ω1 ω1 1− 2ω1
ψ φ 0 ω1 ω2 1− ω1 − ω2
φ ψ 0 ω2 ω1 1− ω1 − ω2
φ φ 0 ω2 ω2 1− 2ω2
models for the prediction of conclusive exclusion mea-
surements. This is because the reasoning about joint
systems from Sec. IV is no longer valid.
Consider, for example, a pair of {ψ, φ} preparation de-
vices comprising a joint system which behaves according
to Table I. Restricting our attention to the behaviour of
either device in isolation, by considering the correspond-
ing marginal probabilities, it is clear that there is proba-
bility at least ω > 0 for the individual device to produce
an ontic state witnessing an epistemic overlap of ψ and φ,
regardless of which preparation was made. Nevertheless,
when the system is considered as a whole, we find that
there is zero probability that both ontic states lie in the
overlap region at once.
The behaviour described in Table I does not satisfy
preparation independence. However, it can easily be
checked that it does satisfy the subsystem condition (5),
and indeed it can even be shown to exhibit independence
up to classical correlations (4). Moreover, based on this
behaviour, it is not difficult to contrive a ψ-epistemic on-
tological model which reproduces precisely the quantum-
mechanical predictions of the conclusive exclusion exper-
iment proposed by PBR, which will thus satisfy both (4)
and (5).
A. ψ-epistemic Model for PBR
If we set Λ := {λ1, λ2, λ3}, let µψ have support
{λ1, λ3}, and let µφ have support {λ2, λ3} (i.e., ∆ =
{λ3}), then Table I fully determines the behaviour of the
preparation devices. We choose the following measure-
TABLE II. Probability table (or empirical model to use the
terminology introduced in [37]) representing the quantum-
mechanical predictions for the probabilities of observing each
of the four outcomes (columns) to the PBR conclusive exclu-
sion measurement, for each possible joint preparation (rows).
pA pB ¬(ψ,ψ) ¬(ψ, φ) ¬(φ, ψ) ¬(φ, φ)
ψ ψ 0 1/4 1/4 1/2
ψ φ 1/4 0 1/2 1/4
φ ψ 1/4 1/2 0 1/4
φ φ 1/2 1/4 1/4 0
ment response functions.
ξ¬(ψ,ψ)(λ) :=

1 if λ = (λ2, λ2)
1/2 if λ ∈ {(λ3, λ2), (λ2, λ3)}
0 otherwise
ξ¬(ψ,φ)(λ) :=

1 if λ = (λ2, λ1)
1/2 if λ ∈ {(λ3, λ1), (λ2, λ3)}
0 otherwise
ξ¬(φ,ψ)(λ) :=

1 if λ = (λ1, λ2)
1/2 if λ ∈ {(λ1, λ3), (λ3, λ2)}
0 otherwise
ξ¬(φ,φ)(λ) :=

1 if λ = (λ1, λ1)
1/2 if λ ∈ {(λ1, λ3), (λ3, λ1)}
0 otherwise
(6)
The quantum-mechanical predictions for the PBR exper-
iment [1] (Table II) are then reproduced by the opera-
tional probabilities
p(o | pA, pB) :=
∑
λA,λB∈Λ
ξo(λA, λB)µ(λA, λB | pA, pB),
(7)
when ω1 = ω2 = 1/2 [36].
VI. TOWARDS A STRONGER THEOREM
In this section, we establish ψ-ontology results which
hold under the less restrictive notions of independence
introduced in Sec. III, beginning with the case in which
preparations are only assumed to be independent up to
classical correlations (4).
First, however, some care is required in order to
properly treat classical correlation scenarios [Fig. 2(b)].
What previously constituted a full ontological descrip-
tion (λA, λB) ∈ Λ × Λ of the combined system has, in a
classical correlation scenario, been supplemented with an
additional element λc ∈ Λc, whose status it is necessary
to address before proceeding. There are two consistent
approaches available to us.
61. We may suppose that λc is an integral part of
the ontic description, and accordingly that the pair
(λi, λc) — rather than just λi — is statistically suf-
ficient for determining the outcome probabilities for
any measurement on the subsystem labelled by i.
2. Alternatively, we may suppose that λc merely
serves as a classical mediator between the λis, and
that λi is still statistically sufficient for determin-
ing the outcome probabilities for any measurement
on the subsystem labelled by i.
Both of these approaches are deserving of considera-
tion; however, for the remainder of this article, we will
commit to the integral-past approach 1, and this is the
context in which the results in this Sec. will hold. In this
case, the issue of nature of the quantum state no longer
comes down the (non-)existence of overlaps for the dis-
tributions µψ, µφ on (Λ,L), but rather for distributions
µ′ψ, µ
′
φ on (Λ× Λc,L × Lc).
Proposition 1. [38]. Suppose there exists a conclu-
sive exclusion measurement for a joint system in which
each subsystem is equipped with a {ψ, φ} preparation de-
vice. For any ontological theory which can describe this
experiment and which is preparation-independent up to
integral-past classical correlations, the ontic state distri-
butions µψ and µφ necessarily have non-overlapping sup-
ports.
Proof. Suppose that µ′ψ(L
′) > 0 for some L′ = (L,Lc) ∈
L′. By (4), we know that conditioned on Lc we have fac-
torisability of the joint probability distributions. With Lc
fixed, the proof of Theorem 1 may therefore be adapted
to apply to the probability distributions µ′(− | ψ,Lc)
and µ′(− | φ,Lc), which as a result must have non-
overlapping supports. Now, if µ′ψ(L
′) = µ′(L | ψ,Lc) > 0
then it must hold that µ′φ(L
′) = µ′(L | φ,Lc) = 0. Thus
µ′ψ and µ
′
φ have non-overlapping supports.
We now turn to proving a ψ-ontology theorem under
the minimal notion of independence, the subsystem con-
dition (5). The analysis refers to an experiment similar
to the one previously considered, but with an important
modification. In the simplest case, the PBR experiment
involved a conclusive exclusion measurement on m = 2
subsystems. Recall, however, that in general m depends
on the angular separation of ψ and φ. We consider an ex-
periment in which a conclusive exclusion measurement is
performed on m subsystems equipped with {ψ, φ} prepa-
ration devices, with the crucial caveat that these subsys-
tems are uniformly sampled from a larger ensemble of
n  m subsystems. Note that the quantum-mechanical
predictions are the same regardless of which m subsys-
tems are taken.
While we will not be assuming either preparation in-
dependence or independence up to classical correlations,
we will require an additional symmetry assumption: that
the joint behaviour of the {ψ, φ} preparation devices
is invariant under permutations of those devices. The
quantum-mechanical description is certainly invariant
under permutations, and so the symmetry assumption
merely supposes that this is also reflected at the onto-
logical level. More precisely, the joint behaviour of the
preparation devices will be described in an ontological
theory by some n-partite conditional probability distri-
bution σ. A permutation pi ∈ Sn acts on σ as follows:
pi·σ(L1, . . . , Ln | p1, . . . , pn) =
σ(Lpi−1(1), . . . , Lpi−1(n) | ppi−1(1), . . . , ppi−1(n)).
(8)
The distribution σ is said to be symmetric if it is invariant
under all permutations pi ∈ Sn.
This kind of shift in focus from independence to sym-
metry (or exchangeability) is standard in Bayesian statis-
tics. As well as appearing to be a rather natural assump-
tion in the present context, note that both preparation
independence and independence up to classical correla-
tions imply symmetry, but not vice versa. In other words,
symmetry is a strictly weaker assumption than either as-
sumption of independence. A simple illustration of this
fact is provided for instance by the well-known example
of Po´lya’s urn [39].
In order to prove our main result, we will also make
use of a generalisation (to conditional probability dis-
tributions) of Diaconis and Freedman’s finite de Finetti
theorem [40], which is due to Christandl and Toner [20].
In the present setting, this theorem establishes that any
symmetric behaviour of the preparation devices which
satisfies the subsystem condition may be approximated
by a description which is independent up to classical cor-
relations [41]. We let ‖µ − ν‖ denote the trace distance
between any two (conditional) probability distributions
µ, ν on the same measurable space [20], and use this to
quantify the approximation.
Theorem 2. (Christandl and Toner [20]). Suppose that
σ is a symmetric n-partite conditional probability distri-
bution on
(Λn × Pn,Ln × Σn) (9)
which satisfies the subsystem condition, and can thus be
marginalised to a unique m-partite conditional probability
distribution µ on
(Λm × Pm,Lm × Σm), (10)
for m < n. There exists a probability distribution µc
on a finite set of single-subsystem conditional probability
distributions labelled Λc, such that∥∥∥∥∥µ− ∑
ω∈Λc
µc(ω)µ
m
ω
∥∥∥∥∥ ≤
min
(
2m|P ||Λ||P |
n
,
|P |m(m− 1)
n
)
. (11)
7We are now in a position to state and prove a ψ-
ontology result which holds under the minimal notion
of independence.
Theorem 3. Suppose there exists an m-partite {ψ, φ}
conclusive exclusion measurement, and suppose, more-
over, that the m subsystems on which the conclusive ex-
clusion measurement is to be performed are uniformly
sampled from a larger ensemble of n > m such subsys-
tems. For any symmetric ontological theory satisfying the
subsystem condition and describing this experiment, the
epistemic overlap of ψ and φ is subject to the bound
ω(ψ, φ) ≤ min
(
4m|Λ|2
n
,
2m(m− 1)
n
)
. (12)
Proof. Let ∆ be the measurable set of ontic states wit-
nessing the epistemic overlap of µψ, µφ. Then
ω(ψ, φ) = min
p∈{ψ,φ}
µp(∆)
= min
p∈{ψ,φ}
pi · µ(∆,Λ, . . . ,Λ | p, P, . . . , P ), (13)
for all permutations pi ∈ Sm. The first line follows from
a re-statement of Eq. (2), and the second follows from
the symmetry assumption together with the definition
of marginalisation to a single subsystem. By Theorem
2, we know that there exists a probability distribution
ν =
∑
ω∈Λc µc(ω)µ
m
ω satisfying (11). Since ν describes
preparation correlations which are independent up to
conditioning on ω ∈ Λc, Proposition 1 tells us that
νp(∆) = 0, (14)
for all p ∈ {ψ, φ}. Then
ω(ψ, φ) ≤ µp(∆)
= |µp(∆)− νp(∆)|
= |µ(∆,Λ, . . . ,Λ | p, P, . . . , P )
−ν(∆,Λ, . . . ,Λ | p, P, . . . , P )|
≤ ‖µ− ν‖
≤min
(
4m|Λ|2
n
,
2m(m− 1)
n
)
,
(15)
where the first line again follows from the definition of
ω [Eq. (2)], the second from Eq. (14), the third from
Eq. (13), the fourth from the definition of trace distance,
and the final line from Eq. (11) and the fact that the
cardinality of the set of preparations is |P | = 2.
VII. CONCLUSION
All no-go theorems rest upon certain assumptions, the
justifications for which should in each case be carefully
considered [42]. In particular, the PBR theorem relies
on the assumption of preparation independence, which
we have argued here may be too strong. Indeed, it does
not allow for any correlations in the global ontic state of
a multipartite system, though in light of the theorems of
Bell and Kochen and Specker it is known that any onto-
logical theory that accounts for the predictions of quan-
tum mechanics will necessarily have such correlations at
the ontological level.
We have seen that it is still possible to obtain ψ-
ontology results by assuming less restrictive notions of
independence, which to varying degrees do allow for cor-
relations in the global ontic state, and which can be more
strongly justified than preparation independence. Propo-
sition 1 allows for independence up to classical correla-
tions, and Theorem 3 applies more generally for any cor-
relations consistent with the the very minimal notion of
independence, the subsystem condition (5). At the same
time it must also be noted that these results inevitably
introduce other assumptions (the integral-past and sym-
metry assumptions), the implications of which remain
to be further explored, and whose justifications should
equally treated with due circumspection.
From a theoretical perspective, Theorem 3 rules out ar-
bitrarily small ψ-epistemic overlaps, since quantum the-
ory can perfectly well describe ensembles of n subsystems
equipped with {ψ, φ} preparation devices for arbitrarily
large n. Therefore, while it is always possible to con-
trive ψ-epistemic toy models for conclusive exclusion ex-
periments by exploiting correlations in the global ontic
state, as demonstrated explicitly for the PBR experiment
in Sec. V, any full-blown ontological theory which admits
arbitrary composition of (sub)systems and respects our
symmetry and integral-past assumptions is necessarily ψ-
ontic [43].
From an experimental perspective, of course, it is still
meaningful and of importance to test whether it is in fact
the quantum-mechanical predictions or those consistent
with, in this case, certain ψ-epistemic ontological theo-
ries that are borne out by observation, and Theorem 3
suggests a means of placing experimentally established
bounds on epistemic overlaps.
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Appendix A: ψ-ontology in relation to nonlocality
and contextuality
A natural question to ask is how the notion of ψ on-
tology and the no-go results discussed in this article
relate to the notions of nonlocality and contextuality
as established by the no-go theorems of, e.g., Bell and
Kochen and Specker. A first observation is that all of
these notions are couched in terms of ontological theories:
the theorems all suppose the ontological assumptions of
Sec. II and identify differing operational predictions be-
tween certain classes of ontological theories (ψ-epistemic,
local, noncontextual, or subclasses of these) and quantum
theory.
In [18], we posed the question of whether objects other
than the quantum state might give rise to epistemic over-
laps on space of ontic states. For instance, if we accept
the ontological assumptions then the ontic state is sta-
tistically sufficient for determining the outcome proba-
bilities for any given measurement on the system. So
for each measurement the theory determines a family of
probability distributions on a set O of outcomes condi-
tional on the ontic state λ ∈ Λ. From this, by Bayesian
inversion, we can also obtain a family of probability dis-
tributions on the set of ontic states Λ conditional on the
outcome o ∈ O, provided that the ontological theory is
parameter independent or non-contextual [44]. There-
fore, we can also meaningfully ask whether measurement
outcomes can give rise to epistemic overlaps [45].
Outcome-ontic theories in this sense are precisely the
deterministic, non-contextual ontological theories; deter-
minism being the requirement that for all measurements
and all λ ∈ Λ the corresponding distribution over out-
comes is a δ-function. The failure of an empirical model
(i.e.,a probability table representing either empirical data
or theoretical predictions for empirical data) to be realis-
able by a deterministic, noncontextual ontological model
is precisely an instance of contextuality. Equivalently
[37], contextual empirical models may be characterised as
those which fail to have realisation by a factorisable on-
tological model, and thus contextuality generalises non-
locality (a term which applies in the special case of a
multipartite measurement scenario).
Any instance of nonlocality or contextuality in a quan-
tum mechanically realisable empirical model, therefore,
provides a contradiction between the predictions of quan-
tum mechanics and those of outcome-ontic ontological
theories. The theorems of Bell, Kochen and Specker,
etc., which identify such empirical models, can thus be
re-interpreted as no-go theorems which rule out outcome-
ontology. Note the apparent duality here: while ψ-
ontology theorems rule out certain ψ-epistemic theories,
nonlocality or contextuality theorems rule out certain
outcome-ontic theories.
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